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•ERCEPTlONALiSM 



- SySTE: ' ':-i!LOSOPH 



PROF. EDWARD j^ HAMIlTON, D.D., 



'IRJS/'IAN, THI 



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Christian T 



HRISTIAN IHOUGHT, 



PERCEPTIONALISM : A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 

[Delivered before the American Institute of Christian 
Philosophy, August nth, 1891.] 

By Prof. Edward J. Hamilton, D.D., New York. 

THE word *' perception," in its ordinary meaning and widest 
application, signifies the correct apprehension of fact or 
truth. On this basis, that philosophy which examines and ex- 
plains perceptions as such, may be styled PERCEPTIONALISM. 
Let us discuss this name and give some reasons for the use of it; 
and let us consider the nature of the philosophy which it desig- 
nates. 

The Latin preposition " per," like its English equivalent 
" through," often indicates instrumentality, or agency, as in the 
maxim, "Qui facit per alium, facit per se"; but " per" never has 
this meaning when used as a prefix in the composition of words. 
It then signifies either movement through or over some place, 
as in the verbs peragro^ perambulo, permitto, perrumpOy or else 
thoroughness in the performance of some action, as in the verbs 
pereo, perfero, perficio, pernegOy pernosco. This last thought — 
thoroughness — is the ordinary signification of per" as a prefix, 
and is that belonging to it in the words "perceive" and "per- 
ception." 

The verb " percipere " and the noun "perceptio" originally 
meant any thorough taking of a thing, so as to bring it within 
one's possession. In the seventeenth chapter of Cato Major, 
Cicero speaks of the ** perceptio fructuum," or harvesting of 
fruits; and, in the same chapter, he says " Themistocles omnium 
civium perceperat nomina " ; that is, Themistocles had learnt, or 
mastered, the names of all -the citizens. These quotations illus- 
trate the transfer of the word from a physical to a psychical 

I 



i R^ 



V 



PERCEP TIONALISM. 



application. But *' percipere," as indicating intellectual ap- 
prehension, does not always, nor even generally, include 
memorizing; as it does when Themistocles is said to have learnt 
the names of his fellow-citizens. Ordinarily with the Romans 
this word ^gnified simply the cognition of fact or truth; and es- 
pecially, when they spoke of perceiving a thing by the senses or 
by the mind, they used language just as we do: they meant that 
psychical operation by which one comes to know that a thing 
is, or what it is, or that it would be, or what it would be. And 
this is a very natural use of language; for when we have gained 
the knowledge of any fact or truth, we may then be said to have 
taken something into our possession, whether we retain it after- 
wards in our memory or not. 

In short, perception and cognition are two names for the 
same process. They differ in that perception emphasizes the 
thought of the process more than that of the result, while cog- 
nition emphasizes the thought of the result more than that of 
the process. But perception always terminates in knowledge, 
and is therefore cognition; no act or process is called perceptive 
except on the assumption that it produces absolute and well- 
founded conviction. 

These statements will be confirmed if we consider the differ- 
ent modes of perception which occur in our daily experience. 
There are three simple modes of immediate cognition. Men 
perceive their own bodies and bodily affections and the immedi- 
ate causes of these affections; and such cognition is the begin- 
ning of all sense-perception. They perceive their own souls as 
in activity, as thinking, feeling or willing; and this we call con- 
sciousness, or internal perception. Then, in connection with 
bodily and mental phenomena, they perceive spacial, temporal, 
causal and other relations; and, along with these relations, cer- 
tain fundamenta on which they rest, such as spaces, times and 
changes. All such cognitions maybe distinguished as concomi- 
tant perceptions, because they accompany those of sense-percep- 
tion and consciousness. Thus, there are three simple modes of 
immediate perception. 

We also form compound immediate perceptions, especially 
of external objects; and these prepare the way for inferential, or 



PERCEPTIONALISM, " 3 

^* acquired " perception. The boy born blind, who obtained 
sight through a surgical operation, could not at first distinguish 
the cat from the dog visually, though he could tactually. 
Catching the cat one day he passed his hands over her, and 
identified what he felt with what he saw. Then he set her down 
and said, " So, puss, I shall know you another time." Here a 
concomitant perception compounded the cognitions of sight and 
touch ; and evidently a basis for subsequent inference was se- 
cured by means of that compositional cognition. Hereafter, 
whether puss be seen in the day-time or handled in the dark, the 
same knowledge will be obtained through one sense which 
originally resulted from the use of two. All our ordinary sense- 
perceptions are more or less "acquired"; and some of them, 
such as determinations by the eye of the distance, size and 
shape of remote objects, are quite complex judgments. 

More evidently, though not more really, inferential than the 
ordinary discriminations of sense are those rational perceptions 
by which things are seen as necessarily or probably or possibly 
consequent upon given antecedents. Here, perhaps, it would be 
more literal to say that a thing is inferentially perceived when it 
is necessary, and that, in other cases, we only perceive that it 
may probably or possibly exist; yet, even in these cases, we 
speak of perception if the judgment be made correctly. Because 
we may know that a thing is probable or possible. 

All rational perceptions are related to our presentational 
cognitions, and seem consequent upon them. For in the im- 
mediate cognitions of fact we perceive, not merely simple fact, 
but also, by a concomitant cognition, various necessary rela- 
tions according to which one fact is conditioned upon, or con- 
nected with, another. This prepares us for logical inference; so 
that afterwards, when a necessitant, or a necessary condition, ap- 
pears, we can infer a necessary or a possible consequent, such as 
the case calls for. 

Then, too, we must mention that important mode of rational 
perception which takes place even in the absence of any ante- 
cedent. For the mind, using that marvellous power of concep- 
tion which deals with things that are not as if they were, makes 
inferences from supposed or imaginary premises. Therefore we 



4 PERCE P TIONA L ISM. 

recognize hypothetical as well as actualistic perception, and 
hypothetical as well as actualistic knowledge. 

Now, as every mode of perception — whether it be presenta- 
tional or inferential, whether it be actualistic or hypothetical — 
claims to be a mode of cognition and to result in knowledge, it 
is plain that the doctrine which explains perceptions as such 
must assert and maintain the reliability of our perceptions. In 
other words, Perceptionalism must teach that what men call 
their perceptions are true perceptions, and that what men know 
they truly know, and that these positions are justified by the 
most thorough examination of both thought and fact. 

It may cause astonishment to some that any system should 
set forth such teaching as distinctively its own. It may be 
asked, *' Do not all philosophers accept the perceptions of man- 
kind as veritable cognitions ? Is it not presumptuous in one 
school to assert that this doctrine is specially and pre-eminently 
the result of its own investigations ? " We reply that the past 
history of philosophy, and the condition of philosophy at the 
present time, warrant the statement that all the more celebrated 
systems, both of ancient and of modern days, conflict more or 
less with the ordinary convictions of mankind; and by far the 
greater part of the speculative talent of the existing generation 
not only rejects the radical idea of Perceptionalism, but con- 
siders that idea a mark of intellectual shallowness. The popu- 
lar philosophies of to-day, while differing from each other, are 
wonderfully agreed in explaining away various fundamental be- 
liefs. Who are more antagonistic than the Associationalists of 
England and the Idealists of Germany ? Yet both teach that 
we have no proper knowledge of an external and material world; 
both declare that space and time are mental products, and not 
things which have independent natures of their own; and, ac- 
cording to both, substances, powers, the relation of cause and 
effect, and necessitudinal connections generally, are merely forms 
of conception. 

Then, too, particular schools of philosophy, in their very 
points of variance from each other, are at variance also with the 
judgments of mankind. Materialism, in saying that the soul is 
composed of a multiplicity of molecules, and that its life is the 



PEKCEPTIONALISM. 5 

action of these molecules, denies that unity of the human spirit 
in which all men believe; on the other hand, Pantheism denies 
the well-known multiplicity of agents and objects in the universe, 
asserting that there is one only substance. 

In view of the history of speculation, the student of theories 
might even question whether there is any thorough-going sys- 
tem which maintains the reliability of human cognitions. But, 
at the same time, if he were convinced that there is such a sys- 
tem, he could not refuse it the name Perceptionalism. In every 
scheme of metaphysical philosophy, the theory of knowledge is 
the fundamental part, and that from which it is most expressive- 
ly-designated. We advocate the name " Perceptionalism," not 
only on the ground that there is a philosophy which should be 
known under this title, but also because we believe that the sys- 
tem thus distinguished is likely hereafter to receive more prom- 
inent consideration than has been accorded to it heretofore. 

In ancient times there was no such system. Aristotle asserts 
that the beginning of all knowledge is that '' natural power of 
judgment which is called perception " {pvva}Aiv Gvpiqjvrov upi- 
riK7]v Tfv KokovGiv awQrfGiv')-^ but he did not investigate our 
first cognitions so as to determine their content and establish 
their correctness. The Stoics held that aiaOijai^, or the im- 
mediate perception of fact, is the origin of knowledge and the 
criterion of truth; and this same doctrine was taught by the 
Epicureans. Moreover, both these schools, agreeing with the 
Aristotelians, declared that man's rational perceptions are reli- 
able; though they allowed that reason may err, and taught that 
mistakes in perception are to be attributed, not to the senses, 
but to judgment, or inference. Both also went farther than the 
Aristotelians in exalting aiodrfGi? — in this connection signify- 
ing specifically presentational perception — as the source of knowl- 
edge; and, with this doctrine, they opposed Platonism on the 
one hand, and Skepticism on the other. Yet neither the Stoic 
nor the Epicurean system attained a permanent success; neither 
proved sufficient to resist the Neoplatonism and Mysticism of' 
the first centuries of the Christian era. 

In subsequent times Scholasticism, applying Aristotelian ideas 
to the doctrines of the Church, showed great dialectic power, 



O PER CEP TIONA LISM. 

but added little to scientific knowledge. Finally, after the theo- 
logical awakening of the sixteenth century came the speculative 
activity of the seventeenth; and towards the close of the seven- 
teenth century, in the year 1689, John Locke gave to the world 
the beginning of a great philosophy. 

Locke founds all knowledge on " experience," and has, there- 
fore, been styled the founder of an '* empirical," or associational- 
ist, philosophy; but erroneously. By *' experience " Locke 
means simply presentatijnal perctption — the aiadqaii ^ of Aris- 
totle, and of the Stoics; and '' sensation and reflection " are the 
names which he gives to the outward and to the inward modes 
of this perception. Moreover, he teaches that the perception of 
necessary relations occurs in connection v/ith the cognition of 
simple fact, and is absolutely and objectively intuitive. Tliese 
initial principles of Perceptionalism were obtained by Locke from 
the critical observation of the phenomena of mind. Yet his 
** Treatise on Human Understanding," defective in the develop- 
ment and yet more in the expression of its thought, did not 
save the eighteenth century from the Associationalism of Hart- 
ley, the Idealism of Berkeley, and the Skepticism of Hume. 

In opposition to these destructive theories, the "Essays'" of 
Thomas Reid, the Glasgow professor, were written towards the 
close of the eighteenth century. In these the natural force of 
the ordinary convictions of mankind was powerfully directed 
against the subtle errors of that day. But the thought of Reid 
is lacking in theoretic discrimination and construction. He often 
assumes first principles; sometimes leaves difificulties unex- 
plained; and can scarcely be said to have produced a philosophic 
system. His excellence and his deficiency are both expressed 
when he is characterized as ** the apostle of common sense."" 
Mightily defending the truth, he left it as he found it, without 
analysis and without systematization. 

^AladjjaLg with the Greeks referred pre-eminently, but not exclusively, to sense-per- 
ception. Aristotle speaks of reason as a higher kind of aladrjcti; and also of the 
moral faculty in the same way. Thus, in his Ethics we read: ** Tovro npog raTila 
(iba ToiQ avdpuiroL^ Idiov, to (xovov ayaOov Kai kckov Kat SiKaiov kui aS'iKOv nai tcjv 
aTJ.uv aladriaiv ex^tv." The verbs alodavofiai, sentio zn6. perceiv all have about 
the same significance and the same breadth of application. 



PERCEPTIONALTSM. 7 

During this nineteenth century some advance has been made 
by eminent philosophers, who have called themselves Intuition- 
alists. Their writings thoroughly discuss both original (or pre- 
sentational) and acquired (or inferential) perception; and also 
throw much light on those immediate cognitions of necessary 
truth which, because they take place hypothetically as well as 
actualistically, and in the absence as well as in the presence of 
objects, have been called ''the intuitions of the mind." Never- 
theless, so far as we can learn, no teacher of Intuitionalism has 
succeeded in founding a school in which, like the patriarch, ''he 
will command his children after him." Ambitious pupils, how- 
ever carefully instructed, do not become permanent disciples. 
They read and study further — as they ought to do — and then 
are more or less influenced by some imposing and skillfully con- 
structed system of error. 

We ascribe this to the narrowness and incompleteness of In- 
tuitionalism. Correct, so far as it goes, it is but the commence- 
ment of a philosophy. Its teachings regarding the immediate 
perception of fact and the necessary relations of fact should be 
united with others, equally important, concerning the rational and 
discursive intellect, and concerning thought and conviction in 
general. In short, with sincere respect and consideration both 
for ancient tradition and for modern theory, we assert the need 
of a new and comprehensive elaboration of mental science. 

The name " Intuitionalism " of late years has been very prop- 
erly abandoned as the designation of a system of philosophy; it 
is not only confined in its suggestions, but is also affected with 
an obscurity arising from the ambiguities of the word " intuition." 
And the name "Realism," which some propose, is yet more un- 
satisfactory. This title belongs historically to the doctrine of 
the reality of " universals " — a doctrine rejected by those who 
would now call themselves Realists. It also furnishes ground for 
quibbling controversy. For those philosophers who reject the 
ordinary beliefs of men do not admit that they deny reality. 
They say, " The question is not, ' Is there reality } ' but ' What 
is it .'* * and ' How shall we think about it t ' " And they protest 
against the settlement of such questions dogmatically, or in any 
other way than by a process of critical investigation. 



8 FERCEPTIONALISM. 

Moreover, it is to be remembered that a most important 
class of human perceptions — including general judgments, and 
among these axioms, or the principiated intuitions of necessary 
sequences — do not, properly speaking, assert reality, but only 
hypothetical truth. 

On the whole, Perceptionalism appears to be the best desig- 
nation for a philosophy which teaches that man's immediate or 
intuitive convictions are never mistaken, and that, under certain 
conditions and limitations, even his inferential conclusions may 
be relied upon. For us, this name defines a system of doctrines 
to which scientific method leads, and which, we believe, is des- 
tined to be generally accepted by thinking men. At the same 
time we are far from saying that the doctrines of Perceptional- 
ism have reached perfection or completion ; that would be too 
great a claim. We assert only that many leading positions have 
been established, and that the future of this system is assured 
beyond a peradventure. 

Some learned professors condemn this confidence of ours as 
that of '■'' a rustic philosopher who has never adequately studied 
the deeper phases of the cognitive problem " ; and many others 
regard a system which prefers the views of the vulgar to those 
of illustrious theorizers to be of very dubious value. It must 
even be acknowledged that a certain presumption against 
our philosophy is natural and reasonable. We trust, however, 
that we shall not be excluded from a candid and attentive hear- 
ing while stating some doctrines in the connected assertion of 
which Perceptionalism may — as we think — not only claim to be 
a system, but also challenge comparison with other systems. 
We shall simply state these doctrines, without discussing them 
at any length. 

First of all, we need scarcely say that Perceptionalism agrees 
with assertive, and differs from skeptical, systems in holding that 
there is such a thing as knowledge, and that some things are 
self-evident, or immediately cognizable. For, as Aristotle says, 
it is folly to seek proof for everything. If there be knowledge 
at all — if we have absolute and well-founded conviction about 
anything — some knowledge must be immediate, or " intuitive " ; 
and other knowledge must be consequent upon that. Therefore 



PERCEPTIONALISM. 9 

earnest thinkers seldom ask, ** Is there knowledge ? " but *' What 
is knowledge ? " and also, '* How do we know ? " and, " What do 
we know ? " 

Again, Perceptionalism teaches that cognition — and, in par- 
ticular, cognition by the senses — is an extremely different thing 
from sensation. Cognition is an intellectual operation ; sensa- 
tion is a feeling — a psychical commotion — produced by the action 
of the nerves upon the spirit. Sense-perception is conditioned 
on sensation because it involves a cognition of the sensation, but 
it does not include the sensation. The cognition of the sensation, 
but not the sensation itself, is an element in sense-perception. In 
order to perceive the acidity of a lemon, this juicy fruit must be 
applied to the tongue so as to produce a specific feeling. There- 
upon — and in one and the same act — we perceive the sensation 
and its causal correlative. 

The thought, or conception, of a sensation should not be 
identified with the sensation. The thought of the feeling of sour, 
ness, or of the feeling of hunger or thirst, or heat or cold, or 
hardness or softness, is a different thing from that feeling; so, 
likewise, the cognition of a sensation is not the sensation. There- 
fore, the act of sense-perception does not include the sensation, 
but only the cognition of it, together with that of its cause. 

Some corporeal sensibilities — especially the visual — are so 
delicate and so intellectual in their use that their character as 
feelings is eclipsed by their service as the instruments of per- 
ception ; yet, even in such cases, we distinguish the feeling from 
our cognition of it. For example, the pleasure derived from cer- 
tain sensations of color arises from feeling rather than from per- 
ception. 

But if thought and sensation are things radically different, 
then the teachings of Sensationalism must be rejected ; for this 
doctrine affirms that cognition, memory, conception, imagina- 
tion, and intellectual activity of every kind, are either bodily 
feelings or the reproduction and refinement of such feelings. 
Not only so, we must reject also that more specious theory 
which speaks of " the sensational elem.ents of knowledge," and 
according to which sense-perception is the combined action of 
the reason and the sensibility. The error involved in this theory 



lO PERCEPTION ALISM. 

is double, and is the beginning of further error. For no one 
can rightly explain sense-perception if he do not see both that 
sensation is not, and that the cognition of the sensation is, a 
constituent part of the perception ; and no one can correctly 
understand the nature of thought in general who fails to see that 
sense-perception, though conditioned on sensation, is wholly 
intellectual, and contains no sensational element whatever. 

In the next place, Perceptionalism distinctly recognizes that 
mode of cognition which we have called concomitant perception. 
Our bodily parts and things in contact with them become known 
to us in sense-perception, and this originates our knowledge of 
material substances and qualities. Consciousness reveals the 
soul and its powers in various states and operations ; and thus 
our acquaintance with the spiritual world begins. By concomi- 
tant perception we learn of things which are less directly, though 
not less immediately, perceived than are the objects of sense- 
perception and consciousness. For example, the relations of 
both material and spiritual things, and those portions of space 
and time which are immediately related to one's body and one's, 
soul, are perceived concomitantly. 

Neither this mode of perception nor the objects of it can be 
properly recognized by those who hold that sense-perception 
and consciousness are the only modes of immediate cognition, 
and who confine the former of these to things that can be 
touched or felt, and the latter to the experiences of one's own 
spirit. But many authors, following Locke, say that space and 
time, and the relations of space and time — as also quantity and 
change and their relations — are truly perceived along with the 
more direct objects of our cognition. These writers teach also 
that space is known in connection with sense-perception, and 
time in connection with consciousness. All such should welcome 
the doctrine of concomitant perception as an improved state- 
ment of the truth. For time is not perceived exclusively in 
connection with consciousness, nor space exclusively in connec- 
tion with sense-perception. Both are perceived along with both 
modes of cognition, and by means of a cognition of their own. 

This concomitant perception does not differ from that which 
it accompanies in its nature, but only in its objects and in the 



PER CEP TIONA LISM, 1 1 

fact that these are viewed, as it were, obliquely. The cog- 
nition of these objects, like all other cognition, takes place 
when we both conceive of them and recognize their reality. 
For spaces, times, changes, and relations, though insubstantial 
and powerless things, are objects, or entities; for they exist, and 
their existence is perceived as truly as that of substantial agents 
and of the powers and operations of such agents. 

Concomitant perception may be easily illustrated. Let a man 
grasp a warm wooden ball with one hand, and, at the same time 
or soon after, a cold metallic ball with the other hand. He now 
perceives, not only the sensations of weight and touch and tem- 
perature, and the balls as causative of them, but also each hand 
and the ball in it as in contact with one another. He perceives, 
further, that his hands and the balls in them have separate posi- 
tions in space. He compares and contrasts, as to their points of 
likeness and unlikeness, the facts given by his right hand with 
those given by his left. And he recognizes that the parts of 
this experiment take place contemporaneously or successively, 
as the case may be. Moreover, not only the hands and the 
balls, but also all the relations observed, together with the 
space and time and other relata, are as truly and as surely per- 
ceived as are the sensations of weight and touch and tempera- 
ture. By this perception of those entities and relations which 
are immediately connected with his own personality, man be- 
comes qualified for the knowledge of the Universe. 

Thus, teaching concomitant perception, we oppose the doc- 
trine that space and time and change and relation, and even 
substance and power, are not entities at all, but merely modes 
of thinking ; and we challenge the advocates of this doctrine to 
show either that concomitant cognition is not as much a fact of 
experience as any other mode of cognition, or that there is any 
good reason for distrusting its most positive assertions. 

In the fourth place, Perceptionalism teaches that every cogni- 
tion, however simple, contains two elements, which may be dis- 
tinguished as thought and belief, or as conception and convic- 
tion. 

Here terms are used technically, though as nearly as possible 
in conformity with common usage. By thought, or conception. 



L.ofC. 



12 PERCEPTIONALISM. 

we mean that intellectual activity in which we have the idea of 
a thing, and also of its existence or of its non-existence ; and in 
connection with which we may, or we may not, believe in its ex- 
istence, or in its non-existence. By belief, or conviction, we 
mean that confidence in the existence, or in the non-existence, 
of a thing- which, under certain conditions, arises in the mind 
either intuitively or inferentially. 

That there is a radical distinction between thought and 
belief, as thus described, seems clear enough ; but most philoso- 
phers fail to see this distinction. Very often conviction is taken 
to be either a vivid and persistent mode of conception or a pecu- 
liar combination of conceptions. Many, adopting a teaching of 
Aristotle, make existence to be a conjunction, or a relatedness, 
of things, and belief a corresponding synthesis of thoughts. The 
truth is that belief is an intellectual activity wholly sui generis ; 
it is not thought, though it is conditioned on thought ; it is 
a confidence which may, or may not, accompany an idea or com- 
bination of ideas. 

This confidence admits of a variety of degrees, but it does 
not have that marvellous correspondence with the nature, or 
form, of things which characterizes thought, and which may be 
styled *' the objectivity of thought." The lowest degree of con- 
viction is presumption, or guesswork ; the highest, absolute cer- 
tainty. Knowledge (of which cognition is the initial act) is ab- 
solute and well-grounded certainty. 

Moreover, there are two modes of conviction, the actualistic 
and the h3'pothetical. The former of these is belief in the pri- 
mary and literal sense ; the latter is a preparatory and provi- 
sional confidence in connection with the thought of a conse- 
quent as related to the supposed antecedent. These modes of 
conviction differ radically. The hypothetical knowledge that a 
thing would be so is even entirely consistent with the actual- 
istic knowledge that it is not so. Those philosophers who mis- 
apprehend the distinction between thought and belief sometimes 
also fail to distinguish hypothetical from actualistic knowledge. 

This brings us to another point in Perceptionalism, namely: 
the essence of belief lies in the mental assertion of the exist- 
ence, or of the non-existence, of something. Every belief may 



PERCEPTIONALISM. 1 3 

be expressed by a proposition ; and there are two kinds of propo- 
sitions, the presentential and the inherential. The former asserts 
the existence, or the non-existence, of the subject of the propo- 
sition ; for example, " Bread exists " and '* Bread does not exist," 
or, as we more frequently say, ** There is bread," and *' There is 
no bread"; the latter asserts the existence, or the non-exist- 
ence, of the predicate. For example, " The bread is sweet" and 
** the bread is not sweet." For these sentences assume the exist- 
ence of the subject, and assert the existence, and the non-exist- 
ence, of the predicate in its relation to the subject. 

It is astonishing that this account of propositions, though 
self-evident in its simplicity, is not to be found in the writings of 
any authority, whether ancient or modern. All logicians, from 
Aristotle down, have been inaccurate in their analysis of asser- 
tive thought. Their theories have been preparative to this doc- 
trine, which, we think, must be accepted as a final statement. 

It should be noticed that existence and non-existence, though 
not things, or entities, are not mere thoughts, but, in their own 
way, objects of thought. For if a thing exists, it is a fact that 
it exists ; and, if it does not exist, it is a fact that it does not 
exist. This last statement does not mean literally that an 
entity is ever non-existent ; for in order to be truly the subject 
of an assertion an entity must exist ; and it would be absurd 
that what exists is at the same time non-existent. It is only 
asserted that non-existence may be a fact in a case in which an 
entity might be supposed to be ; which idea is also expressed 
occasionally by the term ** non-entity." 

Let us note also that the word " non-existence " is only a rela- 
tive designation and does not indicate a compound nature. Non- 
existence, no less than existence, is an absolutely simple objec- 
tuality. It is named " non-existence" because its whole impor- 
tance lies in its diversity from existence, and not in its own nature. 

The definition of belief as the mental assertion of existence or 
non-existence applies also to our knowledge of fact or truth, knowl- 
edge being absolute and well-founded belief. This same definition, 
also, explains judgment, the initial act of belief, and cognition, 
the initial act of knowledge. For philosophers nece.ssarily use 
the words belief and judgment in a very comprehensive sense. 



54 PERCEPTIONALISM. 

If, now, the essence of belief, judgment, knowledge, and cog- 
nition be the assertive use of existential thought, what shall we 
say of the theory that perceptive judgment, or the cognition of 
fact, is a synthesis of representations (or appearances) under 
some category of conception, whereby the experiences of the 
mind are reduced to this or that mode of unity ? What of the 
definition that " the union of representations in one's conscious- 
ness is judgment " ? (Mahaffey's Kant.) And of Kant's own 
words, " So finde ich, dass ein Urtheil nichts Anderes sei, als 
die Art gegebene Erkenntnisse zur objectiven Einheit der 
Apperception zu bringen " ? Does not this theory miss the point 
altogether ? 

A synthesis of thought may often precede judgment; but it is 
not judgment. A synthesis may be perfected without any judg- 
ment asserting that synthesis ; and, when such judgment takes 
place, it is not a uniting of things in thought ; it is the assertion 
that things do — or do not — exist in the combination conceived 
of. Such is the ordinary perceptive, or cognitive, judgment ; 
and other forms of judgment — the hypothetical and the prob- 
lematic — are to be explained in a similar way. The essence of 
all judgment is not synthesis, but assertion. 

Another important teaching of Perceptionalism relates spe- 
cially to inferential judgment, and may be stated as follows: The 
fundamental principle of inference and reasoning is that of 
Antecedent and Consequent ; and the metaphysical basis of this 
principle is the Law of Conditions. 

By a condition we mean a necessary condition — a sine qua 
non — that without which a thing cannot exist, and which, there- 
fore, is logically necessary if the thing conditioned exist. 

Necessary relations — and therefore, also, conditions — belong 
to the very nature of things, and consequently pervade the 
constitution of the universe. Conditions are either causal, con- 
stitutive, or concomitant. All things within the universe exist 
both as conditioning and as conditioned. But space, time, and 
God, which are conditions of the universe, are free from causal 
conditions. 

When any condition of a thing is known to exist, we say 
that the thing is possible so far as that condition is concerned; 



l-ERCEP TIONA LISM. I S 

and we call that condition, or whatever may contain it, an ante- 
cedent of possibility. Thus if a man be rich, or in any way a man 
of property, he may own real estate, or personal property, or both. 

Necessary conditions, though not necessitative, may be said 
to have a necessitative force ; for logical necessitants are con- 
stituted from them. Thus, a coat would certainly be made if 
there were not only cloth, buttons, thread and other materials, 
but also a tailor and his implements and proper opportunity and 
inducement. A logical necessitant, or whatever contains it, is an 
antecedent of necessity. For example, if a mineral specimen be 
metallic, of a certain specific gravity, of a certain color, and have 
certain chemical qualities, we conclude that it is gold. 

It matters not, for the purposes of inference, whether a 
necessity be absolute or relative — whether it belong to the 
nature of things or to some instituted arrangement. But dem- 
onstration from relative necessity presupposes that no adequate 
power interferes to prevent the sequence ; under which state 
of things the relative becomes the absolute. 

Necessity, widely conceived, is of two modes ; the necessity 
to be and the necessity not to be. Each presents a fact unalter- 
ably connected with an antecedent fact. But negative necessity 
is commonly distinguished as impossibility. So also impossibil- 
ity, widely conceived, is either impossibility to be or impossi- 
bility not to be, the latter of these being commonly called 
necessity. 

Probability arises when an antecedent of possibility is certain 
to be completed into an antecedent of necessity in one or other 
of a plurality of ways, no one of which can be expected more 
than another, and when a given proportion of the possible alter- 
native consequents have a common character. The consequent 
of probability is conceived of and asserted as having that char- 
acter. 

Contingency, as distinguished from possibility, is an indeter- 
minate probability, the ratio of the chances not being settled. 
Both contingency and probability arise from a combination of 
necessity with possibility ; for there is a general necessary con- 
sequent which must be realized in some one of a number of pos- 
sible forms, called chances. 



1 6 PER CEP TIONALISM. 

Let us note; also, that universal propositions respecting logi- 
cal classes indicate laws of necessary sequence, while particular 
assertions set forth contingent sequence. Logical classes are 
creations of the mind, and have their chief use in the statement 
of laws of inference. Hence, the "quantity" of propositions 
should be explained as a secondary expression of necessity and 
contingency — or, as logicians say, of modality. 

Our general survey of the doctrine of belief has brought be- 
fore us a number of fundamental conceptions, each of which 
should be assigned its proper place in a theory of knowledge. 
These conceptions mostly present themselves in pairs, and may 
be expressed antithetically. For example, conviction is either 
actualistic or hypothetical, the former of these being pre-emi- 
nently belief and knowledge, and the latter a preparatory and 
ministerial kind of confidence. Then, actualistic conviction is 
either presentational or inferential ; and inferential actualistic 
conviction is either apodeictic or problematic ; the problematic 
being either in possibility or in probability. 

Necessity and possibility are the primary bases of inference. 
Probability and contingency result from a combination of these 
two bases. Necessity and impossibility are radically of the same 
nature with each other, and may be regarded as two aspects of 
the same thing. 

Hypothetical conviction is essentially inferential. It differs 
from actualistic inference in that the antecedent is supposed, and 
not presented as real ; so that the consequent is only hypo- 
thetically asserted. The form and the sequence of thought are 
the same in hypothetical as in actualistic inference. Both modes 
of conviction alike relate to existence and non-existence ; but, 
in the one, these are merely matters of conception ; in the other, 
they are facts, or realities, or are believed to be such. 

An hypothetical sequence becomes actualistic if the antece- 
dent be asserted as real ; this takes place in *' hypothetical " and 
*' disjunctive " syllogisms, which, therefore, are actualistic in 
their total operation. 

Hypothetical assertion may be either individual or general, ac- 
cording to the character of its antecedent, or subject. All general 
principles are hypothetical sequences ; and they are either nee- 



PER CEP T/ONA LISM, I / 

essary or contingent. They are expressed, in categorical asser- 
tion, either with the " must " and " may " of the " modal " prop- 
osition, or by the " all " and the " some " of the " pure " proposi- 
tion. *' Quantity," universal and particular, is only an expres- 
sion of modality. 

This exposition of the forms of thought employed in judg- 
ment seems plain enough. But clearly, if these forms have been 
rightly presented, they are not so many co-ordinate, independ- 
ent, and ultimate modes of conception, but the various and vari- 
ously related factors of a system. They do not lie side by side 
like the panels of a door or the panes of a window ; they resem- 
ble -rather the unequal branches of a genealogical tree, or the 
parts of a complicated machine. 

Therefore, also, we say that Kant's twelve " categories" can- 
not be accepted as a tabulation of the ultimate forms of judg- 
ment. Had they been proposed as a primary and tentative 
enumeration of assertive modes of thought, with a view to the 
commencement of scientific analysis, they might not have been 
altogether worthless. But as the result of '' an analysis of the 
elements of human reason," that table of categories in four sets 
of three each is an egregious blunder. It is not only founded on 
the false theory that judgment is the faculty which gives unity 
to our ideas by bringing them together under certain general 
forms of conception, but it miserably fails to classify judgments 
according to their true differences. Mistaking the superficial for 
the fundamental, it is defective and misleading in the extreme, 
and is the beginning of an endless and hopeless confusion. 

Yet again, Perceptionalism teaches that general ideas are 
the product of generalization, and general principles of principia- 
tion, and that there is no exception to this rule. Principiation 
is the generalization of sequences, and it involves more than the 
generalization of ideas, for it pertains only to illative proposi- 
tions and is accompanied by an hypothetical belief 

The law according to which principiation takes place is that 
which justifies ''reasoning from example," and may be called 
the homologic principle. It is that the same (that is, an exactly 
similar) consequent may be inferred upon the repetition of an 
antecedent already known to have that consequent. This pre- 



1 8 PERCEPTIONAIJSM. 

supposes that the human mind can perceive, in individual cases, 
the relation between antecedent and consequent, and also what 
elements are essential to the antecedent. 

Induction, or the generalization of *' the laws of nature," is one 
species of principiation: the formulation of ontological principles 
is another. Metaphysical and mathematical axioms are gener- 
alizations from the perception of absolute necessities in individ- 
ual cases ; and these axioms are called self-evident because they 
are conceived and asserted with little consciousness of any men- 
tal process. 

The doctrine that all things which exist are individuals, and 
that general objects and truths are forms of thought constructed 
from individual perceptions, was more definitely advocated by 
Locke than by preceding philosophers ; but it has always com- 
mended itself to sober-minded thinkers. According to this view 
Reason is not the birthplace of general notions and principles, 
but rather the workshop where they are manufactured and 
stored. It is an endowment of mental strength manifested, 
first, in the clear penetrative apprehension of individual facts 
and relations, and then in the analysis, generalization and logi 
cal development of the knowledge thus obtained. This concep- 
tion of the Rational Faculty may be humbler than that of the 
'Nov'i of Plato, or the "Pure Reason " of modern Idealism ; yet, 
if it be the true conception, it is noble enough for us, and to be 
preferred to even the most venerable philosophical myth. 

These views of Reason and its objects consist with that dis- 
tinction which many make between cpaivopisva and vovj^ieva^ 
provided the former be taken to signify all observable actualities 
(including substances, powers, spaces, times, and relations), and 
the latter to signify all the objects of rational cognition or concep- 
tion. For then rovpiera^ when they are individual, are simply 
(paiv6/A€va rationally and clearly understood ; and, when they 
are general, they are merely abstract conceptions derived from 
the perception of the (pairojusva. But, if by cpaivofASva be 
meant only things which can affect the senses, and the implica- 
tion be that no other are immediately perceived, and if by 
vovjusva be meant the objects of rational conception, and the 
implication be that these are things of a different description 



PER CEP TIONA LISM . 1 9 

from objects immediately perceived, then we discard both 
vovjABva and cpaivojxeva as metaphysical fictions and the em- 
bodiments of error. 

Finally, we claim that Perceptionalism is the basis of a relia- 
ble ontology. In other words, it introduces satisfactory theo- 
ries concerning- "the nature of things" — concerning the consti- 
tution of the Universe — and concerning God. This success is 
the result both of the positive, and of the negative, doctrines of 
this system. Those who find the beginnings of knowledge in im- 
mediate presentational cognition build on a firm foundation ; 
and when, in addition to this, they ignore all a pn:.ri assump- 
tions of every kind, they ma)^ be confident that patient investi- 
gation will enable them to distinguish truth from falsehood. 

Some ontological principles, obtained from our immediate 
perceptions, have been already mentioned, as, for example, that 
individuality is the necessary property of everything that exists, 
generality being ascribable only to certain thought-objects which 
have no existence. We have seen also that all things are sub- 
iect to " conditions," so that the Universe is permeated with a 
network of necessary relations. And we have found that the Law 
of Conditions is the philosophical basis of possibility and impossi- 
bility, of necessity, contingency and probability. 

We now add that Perceptionalism necessarily obtains the 
categories, or supreme genera, of Being from the analysis of our 
imm.ediate individual cognitions, these being the origin and 
ground of all human knowledge ; and it proposes the following 
eight Categories, namely, Space and Time, Substance and Power, 
Action and Change, Quantity and Relation*. All these, together 
with their negations, are perceived in connection with one's 
own spirit and one's own body ; and nothing can be conceived 
of that is not either one of these or a combination of more than 
one ; nor can anything exist except according to the nature 
and laws of these eight forms of entity. 

Moreover, as these kinds of entity differ from one another, 
we cannot say that, because each is an entity, therefore there is 
only one mode of entity, or only one entity. In like manner 
those who perceive two forms of substance — the spiritual and 
the material — and many separate individuals of each form, can- 



20 PERCEPTIONALISM, 

not allow either that there is only one substance or that there is 
only one kind of substance. When we think, in the general, 
either of entity or of substance, we think one thought ; but the 
oneness of that thought does not prove that there is only one 
entity, or only one substance. Yet, ever since the dawn of phi- 
losophy, this fallacy has had a wonderful attraction for meta- 
physical speculators. It has given many the fundamental doc- 
trine of a religious creed, as well as the central teaching of their 
philosophy. For the old Eleatic identification of the One, the 
Ex tent, and the All {ro ev, to 6v, xai ro nav), and the de- 
mand of modern Pantheists that ''the antithesis between the 
unity and the multiplicity of Being must be reconciled," both 
rest on the paralogism that Entity is one because the thought of 
Entity is one. 

Perceptionalism, escaping such delusions, recognizes a bound- 
less variety of entities, and at the same time asserts the exist- 
ence of one all-pervading and eternal Spirit. It finds the Uni- 
verse arranged and governed by an intellect not its own, and 
ascribes that intellect to a self-conscious Being. 

We have now named a philosophy, and illustrated its doc- 
trines. Our aim in this has been, in the main, expository. But 
the inculcation of truth is the refutation of error ; and the only 
refutation that can be full and final. Therefore we oppose the 
principles of Perceptionalism to those of the Sensationalism, the 
Materialism, the Idealism, and the Pantheism, of our age. For 
no one grounded in the right doctrine can allow that cognition 
is merely refined sensation, or that spirit is a development of 
matter, or that thought can be identified with its objects, or that 
there is only one substance. We believe that the inadequacy of 
these views will become more and more apparent as the analyses 
of Perceptionalism shall be more thoroughly considered. We 
even venture the hope that certain philosophers, who occasionally 
suggest that their theories would be accepted universally if only 
ordinary mortals had the ability to understand them, may be 
aided, by the teachings of Perceptionalism, to a clearer compre- 
hension of the truth. 



BELIEF OR CONVICTION, 
is either 



I 
ACTUALISTIC 
Asserting fact. 

I 



I 
PRESENTATIONAL, 
(e. g.. This line is white and straight.) 

The perception of presented fact; 

primordial cognition. 



INFERENTIAL. 



I 
HYPOTHETICAL. 
Differing from actualistic, not 
in the form of thought and se- 
quence, but by reason of its pe- 
culiar provisional mode of con- 
viction; it is all inferential, but 
from a supposed antecedent. 
I 



APODEICTIC. 

(e.g., That coin must be gold. 
That line is, and must be, the 
shortest.) From an actual ante- 
cedent. 



PROBLEMATIC. 
(e. g., That coin may be counterfeit.) 
Contingent inference from an actual 
antecedent. 



I 
INFERENCE OF POSSIBILITY. 

(e. g., He may have entered by that 
door.) From the existence of a condi- 
tion, or of conditions, of a thing. 



INFERENCE OF PROBABILITY. 
From the perception of chances. 



PROBABILITY PROPER. 
The ratio of the chances being deter- 
mined more or less definitely. 



I 
CONTINGENCY PROPER. 
The chance-ratio being undeter- 
mined. 



/^ 



INDIVIDUAL INFERENCE. 



APODEICTIC. 

(e. g., If that man 
sin, he will suffer.) 



GENERAL INFERENCE. 
Essentially Hypothetical as set- 
ting forth some law of logical con- 
nection and rational sequence. 



PROBLEMATIC. 
Differs from actualistic problematic inference in 
having antecedent and consequent hypothetical, 
(e. g., If that man be wounded he may die.) 

I 



I 
POSSIBILITY. 
N. B. All hypothetical inference is to 
be explained by reference to actualistic. 



PROBABILITY. 
To be divided in the same way as 
actualistic probable inference above. 



I 
HYPOTHETICAL IN FORM. 



I 
CATEGORICAL IN FORM. 



suSi 



I 
APODEICTIC. 
e. g., If one sin he must 
er.) 



(e.gr. 



PROBLEMATIC. 
If one be wounded he may die.) 



Subdivisible in the same way as prob- 
lematic inference, actualistic and hypo- 
thetical, above. 



MODAL OR CONDITIONATIVE. 



APODEICTIC. 
(e.gr.. The sinner 



PROBLEMATIC, 
(e.g., A wounded 



PURE OR DOGMATIC. 

I 



must suffer.) person may die.) 



UNIVERSAL, 
(e.g., All sinners suffer.) 
Essentially apodeictic. 



PARTICULAR, 
(e. g.. Some wounded die.) 
Essentially contingent. 



The foregoing is a tabulation of judgments — or modes of belief and 
knowledge — such as Perceptionalism calls for. (See page 17 of the preceding 
article.) 

In explanation of it the following remarks may be serviceable : 

1. The term judgment is used in its wide logical sense for the act of the 
mind in forming any kind of conviction from mere presumptive or probable 
belief up to, and including, absolute knowledge. 

3. The table, assumes that every judgment or cognition is (not a synthe- 
sis of conceptions) , but a putting forth of mental confidence — the formation 
of belief or conviction — in connection with the thought of a thing as existing 
or as non-existent. 

3. Every judgment in the table may be either affirmative or negative, 
and, in another and more complex relation, every judgment, whether affirm- 
ative or negative, must be either true or false. 

4. The table illustrates the philosophical importance of inference. Every 
judgment in it, excepting only the presentational, is illative and follows the 
law of antecedent and consequent. 

5. Moreover, all these inferential judgments in their essential nature 
are modal and set forth an apodeictic or a problematic sequence from ante- 
cedent to consequent. Even the pure categorical judgment, as expressing a 
general truth or law of inference, sets forth necessity when it is universal, 
and when it is particular, contingency. The pure categorical, therefore, 
must be explained from the modal and not the modal (or the hypothetical) 
from the pure. These principles involve a considerable modification in the 
theory and treatment of the Aristotelian syllogism. 

6. With the foregoing table compare that of Kant, who says that ' ' the 
function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads: (1) 
QUANTITY, either (a) universal, (b) particular, or (c) singular; ^^2) quality, 
either (a) affirmative, (b) negative, or (c) infinite; (3) relation, either (a) 
categorical, (b) hypothetical, or (c) disjunctive; (4) modality, either (a) 
problematical, (b) assertorical, or (c) apodeictical ; ' ' and who teaches that 
these twelve modes of judgment result from the synthetic use of twelve 
modes of a priori or transcendental conception which he calls ' ' categories.^ * 

7. In the foregoing article some of the leading doctrines of Perception- 
alism are stated rather than discussed. The object has been simply to claim 
for them an attentive consideration. It is hoped that persons interested in 
philosophy may find time thoroughly to compare these doctrines with those 
of existing systems. 

Letters from professors concerning any topic in the psychology, meta- 
physics, or logic of Perceptionalism, will be welcomed by Dr. Hamilton, 
and may be sent to him in care of Wilbur B. Ketcham, 3 Cooper Union, 
New York, 



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UBRARY..OF.,CONGRES^^^^ 



052 A 





